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  1Abstract 
We examine the cause and effect of technology acquisition policy on firm performance, 
using firm-level data between 1957 and 1970.  Our results indicate that in the 
technology acquisition licensing, the government screened a firm’s application, based 
on (i) the industry that the firm belonged to and (ii) firm’s sales ranking in the industry.   
As a result, large but inefficient firms tended to acquire more technologies before the 
deregulation.  Despite  such  screening  process, the technology acquisition policy did 
not result in a serious failure.    The firms that acquired technology grew much faster 
than those did not during the regulation period. (99 words) 
 
Key words: Technology acquisition policy, the productivity of firm 
JEL Classification code: D21 (Firm Behavior), L5 (Regulation and Industry Policy), N0 
(Economic History) 
 
  21. Introduction 
The evaluation of the Japanese industrial policy has experienced substantial 
changes since the 1980s.    Recent studies by Beason and Weinstein (1996) and Porter, 
Takeuchi and Sakakibara (2000) claimed that industrial policy had failed to pick up the 
growing industries. and had sustained inefficient sectors.  In the 1980s, however, 
many economists and political scientists thought it to be one of the major sources of the 
success of the Japanese economy (see for example, Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura, 
1984; Okimoto, 1984; Tyson, 1992; Noland 1993).    Indeed, the evaluation is unstable 
and highly sensitive to the general performance of the Japanese economy.
1 
In this connection, several studies have stressed the importance of relationship 
between industrial policy and productivity growth (Beason and Weinstein, 1996; 
Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998; Okazaki and Korenaga, 1999).
2  But only a few 
studies focused on one of most important but controversial industrial policies that might 
directly affect on the productivity growth: the foreign technology acquisition policy, 
which was intensively implemented in the 1950s and 1960s, based on the licensing of 
foreign technology acquisition by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI). 
Our motivation comes from two lines of researches.    One is the literature on 
the technology acquisition policy, specifically the licensing of technology acquisition 
itself.    The studies in this line are mainly based on macro and industry level data and 
descriptive materials.  Among them, Ozaki (1972) and Peck and Tamura (1976) 
provided with many significant stylized facts on technology acquisition policy in Japan. 
According to Ozaki (1972) and Tamura and Peck (1976), the regulation on foreign 
technology acquisition, which had been strictly implemented in the 1950s, started to be 
relaxed in the early 1960s.    As will be described in the next section, we can identify 
three periods in the postwar history of technology acquisition policy until the end of the 
high economic growth, namely the periods 1952-62, 1963-68, and 1969-72.  In the 
first period, the government strictly controlled technology acquisition, and licenses were 
concentrated on intermediate goods industries.    In the second period, liberalization of 
the control started, and acquisitions by consumption and export goods industries 
increased.    Finally in the third period, liberalization substantially progressed. 
The other line is the microeconometric analysis of the technology acquisition.   
Odagiri (1983) analyzed correlation among R&D expenditure, patent royalty payments 
and sales growth, using firm level data from 1969 to 1980.    He found the positive and 
significant correlation between patent royalty payments and R&D expenditure, which 
                                                        
1 Some studies stressed that the Japanese industrial policy did not affect very much on the firm 
behavior, including international trade.  See for example, Saxonhouse (1983) and Weinstein (1995).  
Similarly, Okimoto and Saxonhouse (1986) presented the evidence that the role of public R&D was 
quite limited. 
2 Another aspect is an effect of industrial policy on welfare.  See for example, Noland (1993). 
  3are interpreted that those two expenditures were complementary.  The correlation 
between patent royalty payments and the growth of sales was not significant, though.   
On the other hand, Montalvo and Yafeh (1994) analyzed determinants of technology 
acquisition, based on a model of firm’s decision making on technology transfer, using 
firm level count data of licensing from 1977 to 1981.    They found that large part of the 
technological catch up was driven by large firms, especially those with keiretsu 
relationship. 
Each line of studies has significant contributions to the literature.    But the link 
between two lines, namely the link between technology acquisition policy and firm 
performance is not fully explored yet.    The first line of studies ignored the aspect of 
firm heterogeneity while the second line did not pay much attention to the role of 
industrial policy.    To shed light on the nature and consequences of industrial policy, 
more detailed analysis is needed. 
This paper proposes the framework to integrate these two lines of studies.  
That is, we examine the cause and effect of technology acquisition policy on firm 
performance with detailed historical review of the Japanese technology acquisition 
policy, using firm-level data.  Sample period is between 1957 and 1970, which 
includes the years when the regulation was relaxed as well as the years with rigid 
regulation.    Data used in this paper cover more than 1,100 firms and more than 3,600 
acquired technologies. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Next section presents the historical 
overview.  Third section discusses the data used in our analysis.  Fourth section 
examines the cause and effect of technology acquisition on firm performance, and final 
section concludes. 
 
2. Historical  Overview 
The legal framework of the technology acquisition licensing policy was 
provided by the Foreign Investment Law of 1950.  The Foreign Investment Law 
aimed at licensing only those capital imports which were “desirable” to the Japanese 
economy, and at the same time protecting the capitals which were licensed with respect 
to remitting price and earnings (The Bureau of Corporations, MITI, 1960).    For this 
purpose, the Law regulated contracts on technological assistance which lasted longer 
than one year and whose price was paid with foreign currencies, as well as acquisition 
of the stocks of Japanese firms by foreign investors.    If a Japanese firm intended to 
have foreign technological assistance, it should apply a license to the competent 
Ministers, namely the Minister of Finance and the Head of a relevant Ministry.    The 
competent Ministers screened the applications, consulting with the Foreign Investment 
Council. 
The Foreign Investment Law prescribed the following positive and negative 
criteria for licensing foreign capital including technology assistance (Article 8). 
  4Acquisition should be approved only if it would directly or indirectly contribute to the 
balance of payments, or development of important industries or public works.    At the 
same time, acquisition should not be approved, if it was unfair or illegal, or if it gave 
negative influence on Japan’s economic recovery.   
Let us describe the licensing procedure of technology acquisition, taking the 
case of a firm under the jurisdiction of the MITI.    A firm intending to acquire foreign 
technology placed an application form to the Bank of Japan, which passed the form to 
the Industrial Fund Section of the MITI.    The Industrial Fund Section informed the 
application to the relevant bureaus to request their opinions on it.    Then, the Industrial 
Fund Section held a meeting with the applicant firm, the bureau in charge of the 
applicant, the bureau in charge of the industry which mainly used the products of the 
applicant, the Institute of Industrial Technology, and Agency of Patent.    After that, the 
relevant bureaus informed their opinions again to the Industrial Fund Section, which, in 
turn, coordinated those opinions to have the MITI’s opinion.    Meanwhile, the Ministry 
of Finance and the Bank of Japan decided their opinions respectively, and those 
opinions came up for discussion at the secretary meeting of the Foreign Investment 
Council.  If the secretary meeting decided it to be approved, it was passed to the 
Foreign Investment Council to be approved.    If the secretary meeting decided it not to 
be approved, the meeting advised the applicant to withdraw it.    If the applicant refused 
withdrawal, a formal decision of rejection was made. 
The first step of deregulation was taken in 1961.  The positive criteria 
mentioned above implied the idea that only “desirable” foreign technology should be 
acquired.    On the other hand, in the revision of the Foreign Investment Law in 1961, 
the positive criteria for technology acquisition were abolished, and technology 
acquisition came to be approved in principle, if it was not  harmful.  Namely,  foreign 
technology acquisition was approved, unless it would impede similar domestic 
technology which had been or would be applied to business, unless it would unduly 
suppress small and medium-sized firms, unless it would destroy the order of an industry, 
or unless an acquiring firm had not enough capability to assimilate the technology (Year 
Book of Capital Import, 1962, p.2). 
After a small change of regulation in 1966, deregulation substantially progressed 
in 1968.  The new procedure of foreign technology acquisition was as follows.  
Examination of an individual application by the government was required only with 
respect to the technology of the airplane, weapon, gun powder, nuclear power, space 
development, computer and petrochemical industry.  With respect to the other 
technologies, the Bank of Japan approved acquisition, unless the relevant Minister gave 
a special instruction within one month from the application, on the ground that the 
technology acquisition would give a serious influence on the Japanese economy.  
These criteria were for the technology acquisition whose price was larger than fifty 
thousand dollars or not fixed.    Otherwise, the Bank of Japan immediately approved 
  5technology acquisition (Year Book of Capital Import, 1968-1969, pp.11-12)￿ 
Figure 1 presents the number of firms, the number of firms that acquired 
technology, and the number of acquired technologies in our data set.
3  Three  findings 
stand out in this figure.    First, both the number of firms with acquired technologies 
and the number of acquired technologies increased steadily throughout the period.  
The number of firms with acquired technologies increased from 46 in 1957 to 259 in 
1970.  Similarly,  the  number  of acquired technologies grew from 70 in 1957 to 686 in 
1970. 
 
=== Figure 1 === 
 
Second, the number of acquired technologies increased dramatically in 1962-63 
and 1969-70, which is the period right after the regulation on technology acquisition 
was relaxed.    The number of acquired technologies grew from 136 in 1962 to 291 in 
1963.    Further, it increased from 505 in 1969 to 686 in 1970.    These results imply 
that the technology acquisition regulation in Japan effectively constrained firms to 
acquire foreign technologies in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Finally, some firms repeatedly acquired technologies.  The number of firms 
with acquired technologies did not increase not so rapidly as the number of firms and 
the number of acquired technologies between 1957 and 1970.  Despite the rapid 
increases in the number of acquired technologies, most firms did not acquire any 
technology.    This fact suggests that firm and/or industry specific factors might play a 
significant role in acquiring technologies. 
Table 1 summarizes the number of firms and the number acquired technologies, 
by industry.  We split the samples into three periods (1957-61, 1962-68, 1969-70), 
referring to the deregulations in 1961 and 1968.  Table 1 indicates that acquired 
technologies were concentrated in certain industries.  Major importers were electric 
machinery, general machinery and chemicals.  From 1957 to 1970, the number of 
acquired technologies was 872 in electric machinery, 745 in general machinery, and 663 
in chemicals, which accounted for 62.6 percent of the total acquired technologies. 
 
=== Table 1 === 
 
Note that the concentration changed between 1957 and 1970.  The share of 
acquired technologies by these three sectors declined from 65.6 percent in 1957-61 to 
58.8 percent in 1969-70.    On the other hand, textiles and wholesale trade grew from 
2.2 percent and 2.0 percent in 1957-61 to 5.2 percent and 7.2 percent in 1969-70, 
respectively.    In other words, industries other than the three major importers started 
                                                        
3  The detail description of the data will be provided in Section 3. 
  6acquiring technologies after the deregulation. 
 
3. Data 
Our sample firms consist of the Japanese firms listed at the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange in the period 1957-1970.  The sample period covers the high economic 
growth period, and the years when the regulation was relaxed as well as the years with 
rigid regulation.  Two main data sources are used.  Technology acquisition data 
come from the Japan Economic Research Institute (1973), Kigyobetsu Gaishi Donyu 
Soran ( Complete List of Capital Imports by Firm).  We define a technology 
acquisition as an import of foreign technology by a firm. 
Other firm level data come from the Financial Database of the Japan 
Development Bank (the JDB database), which is compiled from the financial reports of 
each firm.    We merged these two data referring to the company name as a key.
4  W e  
omit firms that once disappeared and reappeared in the JDB database between 1957 and 
1970, and firms with unreasonable numbers in the number of workers, total wage 
payments, value-added, tangible assets, and technology acquisition year.  After the 
sample selection, the number of firms is from 349 in 1957 to 1,150 in 1970 (unbalanced 
panel).    The number of technologies acquired by these firms between 1957 and 1970 
is 3,631 (Figure 1). 
Table 2 indicates the difference of total factor productivity (TFP) and labor 
productivity between the firms with acquired technologies and the firms without them.   
Two notable findings are in this table.    First, the productivity of firms with acquired 
technologies was substantially higher than that of the firms those without them.    In 
1970, firms with acquired technologies were 33.1 percent higher in TFP and 33.9 
percent higher in labor productivity than firms without.  Second, this productivity 
difference is observed only after 1961.  Before 1960, the firms with acquired 
technologies present much lower productivity than those without. 
 
=== Table 2 === 
 
Two questions are raised from this systematic difference of productivity between 
firms with acquired technologies and firms without.  First, did firms with acquired 
technologies present higher productivity before they acquired technologies?    Second, 
did firms with acquired technologies achieve higher productivity growth after they 
acquired technologies?  To address these questions, the following section examines 
                                                        
4 We trace the name of company using Tosyo Toukei Nenpou (Annual Securities Statistics) and Tosyo 
Yoran (Facto Book) by Tokyo Stock Exchange.  The firms that change their names are regarded as the 
same companies if they are not merged or acquired.  The firms that were merged or acquired are 
dropped from our sample because the JDB database does not allow us to trace back the information of 
such companies before merger and acquisition. 
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4.  Determinants and Effects of Technology Acquisition 
4.1.  Did good firms acquire technologies? 
Suppose that a firm has to pay some fixed cost to introduce a foreign technology.   
This cost is a sort of search cost.    Once a firm succeeded in acquiring a technology, 
this fixed cost is not required to acquire another technology for a certain period.    In 
other words, the fixed cost is required, only if the firm acquired a technology first after a 
certain period since it acquired a technology last time.    We define this period as one 
year.    Denote this fixed cost as  , and the profit of a firm that excludes this fixed 
cost as 
C
it π ~ .  Assume that  it π ~  depends on the characteristics of a firm,  , and 
policy effects,  : Then the profit of firms 
it X
it G it π   is written as: 
), 1 ( ) , ( ~
1 − − − = it it it it it Y C G X π π                                            
(1) 
where    is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm acquires technology at 
year  , and zero otherwise. 
1 − it Y
1 − t
In the dynamic framework, the firm decides to acquire a technology if the sum 
of current and future profit,  , is larger than the fixed cost.    Denote the discount 
rate of future profit as 
*
it π








otherwise    0







                                             
(2) 
where  ( ) ] 0 | ) ( [ ] 1 | ) ( [ 1 1
* = • − = • + = − − it it it it Y V E Y V E δ π π .  In the empirical analysis, 
we specify the regression equation as follows: 


 > + − − +
=
−
otherwise    0
0 ) 1 (     if     1 1 it it it it
it
Y C G X
Y
ε λ γ
                                
(3) 
where  it ε   is a disturbance term. 
There are several estimation strategies for this dynamic binary choice model 
with unobserved heterogeneity.    For instance, Roberts and Tybout (1997) employed a 
  8probit model with random effects while Bernard and Jensen (1999) uses a linear 
probability model with fixed effects.    However, the linear probability model requires 
instruments, which is not easy to find out.   Hence, we follow Roberts and Tybout 
(1997) and employ the probit model with random effects of the form: 
, 1 1 1 it i it it it it G X Y Y µ η λ γ β α + + + + + = − − −                                    
(4) 
where  i η  is firm specific random effect and  it µ  is pure disturbance term 
( it it it µ η ε + = ).    To avoid possible simultaneity problems, we lag one year all plant 
characteristics and the government effects. 
The dependent variable    is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm 
acquires technology at year    and zero otherwise.    As for firm characteristics , 
we use productivity, size, capital and R&D intensities, liquidity constraint, and the past 
experience of technology acquisition.     
it Y
t 1 − it X
 
Productivity 
We use productivity as a key factor to effect on the profit of firm.    Since TFP 
and labor productivity present high correlation, we use TFP in our analysis to avoid 
multicoliniality.
5    In computing TFP, we employ deterministic (non-stochastic) method 
developed by Caves, Christensen and Diewart (1982) and extended by Good, Nadiri, 
Roller and Sickles (1983).    This index uses a separate hypothetical firm as a reference 
point for each cross-section of observations and chain-links the reference points 
together over time in the same way as the conventional Tornqvist index of productivity 
growth.    In our analysis, 1957 is a reference year and TFP of hypothetical firm in 1957 




Firm size can be an important factor for a firm in acquiring a technology.    The 
scale of sales is a possible measure of firm size (Montalvo and Yafeh, 1994).  
However, it is difficult to compare the value of sales across industries, since it highly 
depends upon industry.    Therefore, we use the sales ranking of each firm in a given 
industry rather than value of sales itself so that we can examine the relative importance 
                                                        
5 For the summary statistics and correlation of variables, see Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 
  9of each firm in the industry.
6    Sales data are from the JDB database. 
 
Capital and R&D intensities 
As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argued, R&D plays an important role not only in 
the innovation but also in the development of absorptive capacity that includes the 
firm’s ability to exploit outside knowledge of a more intermediate sort.    This in turn 
implies that the R&D enable firm to adopt new technologies more easily.    Similarly, 
the capital stock could play a similar role during the 1960s.    To control the difference 
of absorptive capacity, we use capital and R&D intensities.  Capital intensity is 
defined as capital stock-labor ratio, while R&D intensity is defined as the R&D-sales 
ratio.  All variables are from the JDB database.  Capital stock is estimated from 




Montalvo and Yafeh (1994) pointed out the importance of liquidity in the firm’s 
decision to acquire a technology.    Firms without liquidity constraint are more likely to 
have a chance to acquire a new technology.  In order to examine the effects of 
liquidity constraint, we use cash-flow, defined as the sum of profits and depreciation 
costs divided by sales.    All the data come from the JDB database. 
 
Past experience 
One-year lag of technology dummy might not fully capture the effects of past 
experience since the experience can be accumulated through time.    Hence, we also test 
the alternative specification that uses the cumulative number of acquired technologies 
instead of the technology acquisition dummy.  The cumulative number of acquired 
technologies is defined as the sum of acquired technologies starting from 1957.    Data 
are obtained from the Japan Economic Research Institute (1973). 
 
Policy variables 
As for policy variables,  , we focus on industry targeting and deregulation 
on technology acquisition.  To capture the impacts of industry targeting, we use 
subsidies and the JDB loans, following Beason and Weinstein (1996).
1 − it G
7  The  subsidies 
are obtained from Economic Planning Agency (1991), while the JDB loans are obtained 
from Development Bank of Japan (2002).    Since we did not get these variables at firm 
                                                        
6 We define an industry at the two-digit level.  This is because large firms are more likely to produce 
many products across industries but two-digit level can generally cover most products that firm will 
produce. 
7 Horiuchi and Sui (1993) also emphasized the role of the JDB loans as one of industrial policy tools. 
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industry. 
The effect of deregulation is captured by the deregulation period dummy.    This 
variable captures the effects of deregulation on the technology acquisition and takes one 
if the regulation is relaxed and zero for otherwise.  Since the deregulations were 
conducted twice in 1961 and 1968, two dummy variables are employed.  One is a 
dummy variable that takes value one for the period 1962-68 and zero otherwise.    The 
other takes value one for the period 1969-70 and zero otherwise.  If the regulation 
works effectively, the deregulation contributes to the increase in firm’s acquisition of 
technologies. 
We also investigate the cross-effects of deregulation and firm characteristics.  
If the government focuses on some firm characteristics in its screening process, the firm 
characteristics will show the different impacts before and after the regulation.  We 
assume that the government focused on productivity, firm size and past experience in 
the screening process, and examine the coefficients of cross-term between these 
variables and deregulation dummy. 
 
=== Table 3 === 
 
Table 3 presents the regression results of equation (4) with the random-effects 
model.  Major findings are summarized as follows.  First, the coefficients of 
deregulation period dummies indicate positive and significant signs.  Further, the 
coefficient is larger for the period 1969-70 than 1962-68.  This result implies that 
firms could acquire more technologies after 1962, particularly after 1969.  In other 
words, even after we control various firm characteristics and industry effects, the 
significant effect of the regulation is confirmed. 
Second, TFP does not have any effect on technology acquisition, as the 
coefficients do not show statistically significant level.    However, once we introduce 
cross-term between TFP and deregulation period dummy, we observe significantly 
positive impacts of TFP on technology acquisition especially for 1962-68.   
Productivity came to matter after the regulation was relaxed. 
Third, the signs of coefficients in sales ranking also change after the regulation 
was relaxed.    Ranking in sales shows negative and statistically significant signs, which 
implies that the higher a firm’s rank of sales in a given industry, the more the firm likely 
to acquire technologies. However, this relationship is reversed after the regulation was 
relaxed, as we observe significantly positive coefficients on the cross-term between 
sales ranking and period dummies. The result suggests that even a firm with low sales 
ranking could acquire technology after the deregulation. 
Fourth, although the technology acquisition in the previous period does not have 
a significant effect on the current technology acquisition, the cumulative number of 
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cumulative number of technology acquisition shows positive and statistically significant 
signs.  Further, the coefficients of the cumulative number of technologies reversed 
after 1962.  The negative and significant coefficients on cross-term between the 
cumulative number of technology acquisition and period dummies imply that the firms 
without the past experience of technology acquisition could acquire technologies after 
the deregulation. 
Finally, the cash flow presents the positive and significant signs.    This result 
implies that the liquidity is matter in acquiring technology, which is consistent with the 
findings of Montalvo and Yafeh (1994). 
 
4.2.  Did good firms acquire many technologies? 
The analyses thus far have concentrated on whether a firm acquired technologies 
or not.    There is yet another version of argument, that is, how many technologies a 
firm acquired.  As we confirmed from Figure 1, some firms repeatedly acquired 
technologies.  Why did some firms acquire many technologies?  To address this 
question, we examine the determinants of the number of technologies acquired by a firm.   
We assume that the relationship between characteristics of a firm and the number of 
technologies it acquired, is similar to equation (4), substituting the dummy variables in 
the left hand side for the number of acquired technologies. 
Note that the dependent variable has following characteristics: discrete, 
non-negative and often takes a value of zero.  As was discussed in Montalvo and 
Yafeh (1994), the Poisson regression is a possible approach to deal with this type of data 
since the Poisson regression is designed to investigate the relationship between a 
dependent variable that represents the number of events occurred within a given period 
and the exogenous variables that determine its frequency. 
Suppose that the number of acquired technologies    is drawn from a Poisson 
distribution with parameter 
it z
it γ , which is related to the firm characteristics,  , and 
policy tools,  .  Suppose that the relationship between 
it X
it G it γ ,   and   is 
described as the log linear form: 
it X it G
it it it G X λ β γ + = ln .    The Poisson density function is 










γ + = − = = − exp       where ,
!
exp Pr 1 )                   
(5) 
The firm characteristics are the same as those used in the estimation of equation (4). 
Similar to the previous regression, we take one-year lag for the regressors to reduce 
  12possible simultaneity problem. 
 
=== Table 4 === 
 
The determinants of the number of acquired technologies are presented in Table 
4 (random-effects Poisson regressions).  Similar to Table 3, the coefficients of 
deregulation period dummies indicate positive and significant signs.    Furthermore, the 
coefficient is larger for the period 1969-70 than 1962-68.    This result implies that the 
regulation effectively constrained the number of acquired technologies before 1968, 
especially before 1961. 
The coefficients of TFP, sales ranking and cash flow show significant and the 
same signs as those in Table 3. Namely, the TFP came to matter in acquiring 
technologies along with the deregulation, while the positive effect of the sales rank 
declined at the same time.    Liquidity has significant influence on the firm’s decision to 
acquire  technologies.   
Significantly negative signs are observed in the coefficients of the JDB loans.   
In other words, the JDB loans negatively affected on the technology acquisition.    This 
result suggests that the JDB loans might be used not for the support of technology 
acquisition, but for other purposes such as adjustment of declining industries.    There 
were several major tools for the industrial policy in Japan, including technology 
licensing, JDB loans and subsidies.    These policy tools might be allocated to different 
purposes. We will return to this issue later. Finally, the coefficients of the cumulative 
number of technologies do not present statistically significant signs.  Although the 
past experience had a strong effect on whether a firm acquired a technology or not, as 
we saw above, it did not have any significant effect on how many technologies a firm 
acquired. 
 
4.3. Effects  of  Technology  Acquisition on Firm Performance 
Let us now check the opposite causal arrow, namely whether the technology 
acquisition has positive effects on firm performance or not.  To test the effects of 
technology acquisition on dynamic corporate performance, following the method of 
Bernard and Jensen (1999), we run a simple regression of changes in performance 
measures,  , on technology acquisition status, and other exogenous factors.  1 − it X
()












ε λ γ β α + + + + =
− = ∆
− − −
−                                
(6) 
  13where    is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm acquires technology, 
and zero otherwise.      is a vector of firm characteristics at the initial period 
and   is a vector of the government effects.
1 − it Y
1 − it
1 Char.s − it
G
8  Hence, the coefficient β  
represents the gaps in the annual average growth rate of the performance between firms 
with acquired technologies and firms without.  We introduce cross-term between 
technology acquisition dummy and deregulation period dummies for 1962-68 and 
1969-70, in order to capture the effects of deregulation.    The other firm characteristics 
for the initial year are the same as those used in section 4.1. 
 
=== Table 5 === 
 
Table 5 shows the results of regression equation (6) with the random-effects 
model.    The coefficients of technology acquisition present significantly positive signs 
for labor productivity, value-added, capital-labor ratio and R&D-sales ratio before 
deregulation.    This implies that firms with acquired technologies achieved much faster 
growth of labor productivity, value-added, capital and R&D intensities than firms 
without.  However, these positive effects are only confirmed before 1961.  Along 
with the deregulation, the positive effects of technology acquisition disappeared, as the 
coefficients of cross-terms present negative and significant signs.     
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Concluding the paper, we would like to summarize the major results and discuss 
their implications on the industry policy debate.    Our results are summarized as three 
points.  First, until the deregulation in 1968, the government regulation effectively 
constrained technology acquisition in Japan.  As a matter of fact, after the 
deregulation, the number of acquired technologies sharply increased.  Second, the 
characteristics of the firms that acquired technologies were substantially different 
between the regulation period and the deregulation period.  Whereas large firms, 
which did not have advantage in productivity, were more likely to acquire technologies 
before the deregulation, small firms with higher productivity came to acquire more 
technologies after the deregulation.  Finally, the positive impact of technology 
acquisition on firm performance is confirmed.    The firms that acquired technologies 
grow much faster than firms during the regulation periods. 
                                                        
8 Firm characteristics include TFP, the number of workers, average wages, capital-labor ratio, 
R&D-sales ratio, cash-flow while government effects include the JDB loans and subsidy.  Year 
dummies and industry dummies are also included. 
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screened a firm’s application, based on (i) the industry which the firm belonged to and 
(ii) its sales ranking in the industry, and that as a result, large but not relatively efficient 
firms tended to acquire more technologies before the deregulation.  In  other  words,  if 
there had not been for technology acquisition licensing, smaller but more efficient firms 
would have acquired more technologies. 
Despite such screening process, technology acquisition policy worked relatively 
well.  During the regulation period, the firms that acquired technology grew much 
faster than those did not.    This implies that the government successfully picked up the 
firms that would grow after the technology acquisition whether it was by luck or not.   
In this sense, the screening of the acquiring firms by the government did not result in a 
serious failure. 
The role of subsidy and the JDB loans in technology acquisition should be 
interpreted carefully.    The subsidy and the JDB loans did not play an important role 
for firms in acquiring technologies.    In particular, the JDB loans have negative and 
significant impacts on the technology acquisition.  Similarly, Beason and Weinstein 
(1996) argued that Japanese industrial policy fail to pick up the winner based on the 
negative correlation between subsidy/the JDB loans and the TFP growth.    However, 
these negative impacts do not mean the failure of industrial policy.    These policy tools 
were mainly applied for the purposes other than promoting growing industries, 
including adjustment of declining industries and construction of the social infrastructure.   
In the 1950s and 1960s, such industries as mining, transportation and electricity 
continued to have large share of the total JDB loans (Development Bank of Japan, 2002, 
pp.854-855). 
Of course, a part of the growth enhancing effect of technology acquisition in the 
regulation period might be due to the first mover advantage or the rent based on 
restricted access to the foreign technologies, as benefits of technology acquisition 
disappeared after the deregulation.    To control the type of technologies in detail could 
be one possible avenue to discriminate these possibilities.    These problems will be a 
future topic to be explored. 
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  17Appendix: Construction of Multilateral TFP Index 
Methodology 
We use multilateral TFP index developed by Caves, Christensen and Diewart 
(1982) and extended by Good, Nadiri, Roller and Sickles (1983).  The multilateral 
index relies on a single reference point that is constructed as a hypothetical firm that has 
the arithmetic mean values of log output, log input, and input cost shares over firms in 
Japan in each year.  Each firm’s logarithmic output and input levels are measured 
relative to this reference point in each year and then the reference points are 
chain-linked over time.    Suppose that the TFP of the hypothetical firm is equal to one. 
The TFP index for firm   in  year t  is defined as:  i
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where  ,  , and    are the log output, log input of factor  it Q ln it X ln ijt s j , and the cost 
share of factor  j  for firm i, respectively.   t Q ln ,  t X ln , and  jt s  are the same 
variables for the hypothetical reference firm in year    and are equal to the arithmetic 
mean of the corresponding variable over all firms in the year.    The first term of the 
first line in the above equation is the deviation of the firm’s output from the output of 
the reference point in the industry in year  , and the second term is the cumulative 
change in the output reference point between year    and the initial year,  .  The 
two terms in the second line perform the same operation for each factor input 
t
t
t 1 = t
j , and 
are weighted by the average of the cost shares for firm    and the reference point in 
year  .  The index measures TFP of each firm in each year relative to that of the 
hypothetical firm in the initial year.    Since our initial year is 1957, we set TFP of the 
hypothetical firm in 1957 as one.    In this connection, all related variables are adjusted 






There are two ways to define output: gross output and net output, or value-added.   
In terms of production technologies, gross output is more appropriate than value-added.   
However, it is difficult to obtain price deflators for the inputs and outputs of 
non-manufacturing sectors.    Since our observations cover non-manufacturing as well 
as manufacturing firms, we define value-added as outputs.    The value-added deflator 
is obtained from Economic Planning Agency (1991).
9 
                                                        
9 For the detail of industry mapping between the JDB database and Economic Planning Agency 
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Inputs 
Inputs are consists of labor and capital.  Labor is defined as man-hour.  
Working hour data are from Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (various years).   
Capital stock is estimated from tangible assets of the JDB database, following 
Nishimura, Nakajima and Kiyota (2004). 
 
Costs 
Labor cost is defined as total wage payments.    Capital cost is defined as real 
































where    is investment goods deflator,  It p t τ   is corporate tax on business income,  i φ  
is the present value of the depreciation deduction on unit nominal investment,   is 
interest rate, and 
t r
it δ  is  depreciation  rate.  Investment goods deflator is obtained from 
Toyo Keizai (2002) while corporate tax is from Ministry of Finance, website (2003).   
The variables  i φ   is derived so that the following equations are satisfied: 
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The second equation means that the end point of the depreciation period is defined as 
the time when the accumulated depreciation cost approximately equals to 90 percent of 
initial  investment.  Interest rate is defined as bond yield (annual average) from Bank 
of Japan (1967) for 1957-65, and Bank of Japan (1976) for 1966-1970.    Depreciation 
data are from KEO Data Base.
10   
                                                                                                                                                                    
(1991), see Okazaki and Kiyota (2003). 
10 Although capital cost and depreciation rates are certainly different by company, according to its 
managerial condition and production technology, the limitation of data availability forces us to assume 
that capital cost is common to all firms and a depreciation rate is differentiated only between industries.  
KEO Data Base (KDB) has been developed at Keio Economic Observatory.  We thank Koji Nomura 
for the provision of information about KDB.  For the detail of industry mapping between the JDB 
database and KDB, see Okazaki and Kiyota (2003). 

















Number of firms Number of firms with acquired technologies Number of acquired technologiesTable 1.  Number of Firms That Import Technology and the Number of Imported Technologies
(Mean)
Number of firms Acquired technologies









Industry 1957-61 1962-68 1969-70 1957-70 1957-61 1962-68 1969-70 1957-70 1957-61 1962-68 1969-70 1957-70 1957 2.43 3.13 2,694 3,643
Food products and beverages 175 485 145 805 41 01 024 1.5% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4% 1958 0.98 3.32 1,365 3,831
Textiles 198 435 126 759 73 13 371 2.6% 4.1% 4.9% 4.2% 1959 0.93 2.85 1,225 3,558
Pulp and paper products 97 250 74 421 11 19 21 51 4.1% 2.5% 3.1% 3.0% 1960 0.95 2.77 1,552 3,662
Chemicals 266 641 192 1,099 57 131 113 301 21.1% 17.3% 16.7% 17.7% 1961 2.72 2.27 4,235 3,174
Drugs and medicines 53 178 55 286 12 20 24 56 4.4% 2.6% 3.6% 3.3% 1962 5.16 2.12 7,034 3,096
Rubber products 24 94 28 146 81 01 230 3.0% 1.3% 1.8% 1.8% 1963 2.40 2.15 3,750 3,215
Glass, Cement and its products 129 381 115 625 63 12 158 2.2% 4.1% 3.1% 3.4% 1964 3.06 2.02 4,832 3,317
Iron and steel 95 258 76 429 10 22 19 51 3.7% 2.9% 2.8% 3.0% 1965 2.76 2.04 4,618 3,433
Non-ferrous metals 84 210 64 358 21 40 30 91 7.8% 5.3% 4.4% 5.3% 1966 3.79 1.93 6,343 3,297
Fabricated metal products 45 237 74 356 264 12 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 1967 2.74 2.24 5,019 3,839
General machinery 236 902 276 1,414 37 133 105 275 13.7% 17.6% 15.5% 16.2% 1968 3.00 2.28 5,495 4,140
Electric machinery 179 707 222 1,108 60 149 117 326 22.2% 19.7% 17.3% 19.2% 1969 3.52 2.29 6,967 4,277
Transport equipment 157 515 158 830 14 52 56 122 5.2% 6.9% 8.3% 7.2% 1970 3.22 2.42 6,595 4,925
Precision equipment 52 142 42 236 83 72 469 3.0% 4.9% 3.6% 4.1% Notes:
Other manufacturing 36 194 60 290 31 12 135 1.1% 1.5% 3.1% 2.1%
Construction 48 503 165 716 11 01 122 0.4% 1.3% 1.6% 1.3% 2) Firms with tech: firms with acquired technologies.
Wholesale trade 108 415 125 648 94 44 699 3.3% 5.8% 6.8% 5.8% Firms without: firms without acquired technologies.
Retail trade 47 206 66 319 0099 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.5%
Total 2,029 6,753 2,063 10,845 270 756 676 1,702 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Note:
Source: See main text.
Sectoral classification is based on SNA with some modification.
Table 2.  The Difference of Economic Performance Between 
TFP Labor productivity
1) TFP is an index (the TFP of hypothetical firm in 
1957 = 1).Table 3.  Determinants of Technology Acquisition I: Technology Acquisition Dummy Table 4.  Determinants of Technology Acquisition II: number of acquired technologies
Dependent variable: technology acquisition dummy in year t Dependent variable: number of acquired technologies in year t
Independent variables in year t-1 Independent variables in year t-1
TFP 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.001 TFP -0.003 -0.010 -0.004 -0.010
[0.55] [0.29] [1.19] [0.13] [0.55] [1.32] [0.57] [1.32]
TFP * period 1 (1962-68) 0.013** 0.010** TFP * period 1 (1962-68) 0.019*** 0.019***
[2.48] [2.02] [3.29] [3.32]
TFP * period 2 (1969-70) 0.017** 0.008 TFP * period 2 (1969-70) 0.026*** 0.027***
[2.06] [0.90] [3.95] [4.01]
Sales: ranking in industry -0.027*** -0.055*** -0.019*** -0.046*** Sales: ranking in industry -0.038*** -0.079*** -0.038*** -0.079***
[16.16] [12.91] [13.17] [11.33] [16.83] [14.45] [16.92] [14.44]
ranking in industry * period 1 (1962-68) 0.027*** 0.026*** ranking in industry * period 1 (1962-68) 0.037*** 0.038***
[7.18] [7.15] [7.86] [7.87]
ranking in industry * period 2 (1969-70) 0.028*** 0.027*** ranking in industry * period 2 (1969-70) 0.044*** 0.045***
[6.89] [6.84] [8.76] [8.74]
Capital-labor ratio 0.050** 0.037* 0.017 0.006 Capital-labor ratio 0.131*** 0.108*** 0.130*** 0.109***
[2.53] [1.83] [0.97] [0.36] [5.42] [4.52] [5.37] [4.56]
Cash-flow 0.638 1.019** 0.933** 1.158*** Cash-flow 1.144* 1.581** 1.093* 1.619**
[1.25] [1.97] [2.12] [2.63] [1.77] [2.44] [1.69] [2.49]
Subsidy 0.264 0.958 0.271 0.058 Subsidy -1.256 -0.133 -1.345 -0.168
[0.28] [1.01] [0.35] [0.07] [1.41] [0.13] [1.51] [0.17]
JDB loans -10.087* -14.537** -3.204 -6.329 JDB loans -10.245* -13.155** -11.201* -12.793**
[1.69] [2.39] [0.57] [1.11] [1.68] [2.13] [1.80] [2.06]
Research and development 0.076* 0.071* 0.056 0.061 Research and Development -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.000
[1.77] [1.66] [1.43] [1.54] [0.08] [0.04] [0.06] [0.01]
Technology acquisition dummy 0.063 0.037 Number of acquired technologies -0.001 0.008
[1.11] [0.65] [0.17] [0.97]
Cumulative number of acquired technologies 0.113*** 0.201*** Cumulative number of acquired technologies -0.002 0.008
[10.02] [6.53] [1.17] [1.25]
Cumulative number * period 1 (1962-68) -0.098*** Cumulative number * period 1 (1962-68) -0.006
[3.42] [1.03]
Cumulative number * period 2 (1969-70) -0.076** Cumulative number * period 2 (1969-70) -0.007
[2.38] [1.16]
Period 1 (1962-68) 0.673*** 0.380*** 0.334*** 0.089 Period 1 (1962-68) 0.636*** 0.354*** 0.657*** 0.336***
[9.94] [4.81] [4.93] [1.13] [9.96] [4.90] [10.03] [4.41]
Period 2 (1969-70) 1.174*** 0.819*** 0.657*** 0.342*** Period 2 (1969-70) 1.278*** 0.882*** 1.316*** 0.864***
[13.83] [8.35] [7.44] [3.40] [16.00] [9.87] [15.71] [9.00]
Constant -3.373*** -1.704*** -2.747*** -1.434*** Constant -3.936*** -1.855*** -3.948*** -1.847***
[8.19] [5.68] [8.02] [6.52] [7.51] [4.74] [7.52] [4.72]
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9,415 9,415 9,415 9,415 N 9,415 9,415 9,415 9,415
Akaike's information criteria 2.64 2.63 2.62 2.62 Akaike's information criteria 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.06
Log-likelihood -3018.94 -2982.40 -2968.56 -2929.54 Log-likelihood -4994.05 -4935.63 -4993.39 -4935.02
Notes: 1) Random-effect probit model is used for estimation. Notes: 1) Ordered logit model is used for estimation.
2) ***, **, * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 2) ***, **, * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
3) Figures in brackets indicate t-statistics. 3) Figures in brackets indicate t-statistics.
4) For the definition of variables and sources, see main text. 4) For the definition of variables and sources, see main text.Table 5.  Effects of Technology Imports on the Performance of Firm
Dependent variables: 1-year growth
TFP Labor 
productivity
Value-added Number of 
workers




Technology acquisition policy variables
Technology import dummy 0.099 2.868** 3.540** 0.188 -0.302 3.099*** 0.034*
[0.07] [2.02] [2.56] [0.23] [0.27] [2.95] [1.67]
Tech. Acq. dummy * period 1 (1962-68) -1.347 -4.563*** -3.914** 0.901 -0.206 -3.947*** -0.019
[0.83] [2.89] [2.55] [1.03] [0.17] [3.39] [0.82]
Tech. Acq. dummy * period 2 (1969-70) -1.956 -4.497** -4.061* 0.655 0.190 -1.993 -0.067**
[0.89] [2.10] [1.94] [0.55] [0.11] [1.26] [2.20]
Observations 9,415 9,415 9,415 9,415 9,415 9,415 9,415
R-squared (overall) 0.050 0.040 0.050 0.110 0.050 0.070 0.130
Dependent variables: 3-year growth
TFP Labor 
productivity
Value-added Number of 
workers




Technology import dummy -0.592 1.279* 1.410** -0.121 -0.476 2.323*** 0.017*
[0.87] [1.93] [2.05] [0.27] [0.86] [4.09] [1.74]
Tech. Acq. dummy * period 1 (1962-68) -0.157 -1.974*** -1.462* 0.591 0.307 -2.324*** -0.003
[0.21] [2.68] [1.92] [1.20] [0.50] [3.69] [0.29]
Observations 7,453 7,453 7,453 7,453 7,453 7,453 7,453
R-squared (overall) 0.140 0.100 0.080 0.160 0.110 0.110 0.370
Notes: 1) Random-effect model is used for estimation.
2) ***, **, * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% and figures in brackets indicate t-statistics.
3) Estimated coefficients indicate the gaps of growth rate between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms.
4) Year dummies and industry dummies are included (not reported).  The coefficients of year dummies are presented in Figure 2.
5) We also include firm characteristics as control variables.  See main text, for more detail.Appendix Table 1.  Basic Indicators of Variables
N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Technology acquisition dummy 9,415 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Number of acquired technologies 9,415 0.29 1.08 0.00 22.00
Cumulative number of technologies 9,415 1.40 5.44 0.00 165.00
Capital-labor ratio 9,415 1.85 1.66 0.08 24.23
Sales (ranking in industry) 9,415 33.13 27.41 1.00 137.00
TFP 9,415 2.31 7.49 0.05 118.04
Cash-flow 9,415 0.10 0.06 -0.36  0.50
Subsidy 9,415 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.52
JDB loans 9,415 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
Research and development 9,415 0.16 0.51 0.00 9.01
Note: For the definition of variables and sources, see main text.
Appendix Table 2.  Correlation Matrix of Variables
Tech. D Tech. Acq. Cum. Tech. KL ratio Rank TFP Cash-flow Subsidy JDB R&D
Technology acquisition dummy [Tech. D] 1.00
Number of acquired technologies [Tech. Acq.] 0.65 1.00
Cumulative number of acquired technologies [Cum. Tech.] 0.43 0.81 1.00
Capital-labor ratio [KL ratio] 0.07 0.04 0.07 1.00
Sales (ranking in industry) [Rank] -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.15 1.00
TFP 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.12 1.00
Cash-flow 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.04 -0.26 1.00
Subsidy -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 1.00
JDB loans 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.03 -0.14 0.21 -0.17 1.00
Research and Development [R&D] 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 1.00
Note: For the definition of variables and sources, see main text.